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Empirically, large employers have been shown to devote greater resources to ﬁlling
vacancies than small employers. Following this evidence, this paper oﬀers a theory of
producer size based on labor market search, whereby a key factor in the determination
of a producer’s total employment is the ease with which workers can be found to ﬁll jobs
that are, periodically, vacated. Since the geographic localization of industry has long
been conjectured to facilitate the search process, the model provides an explanation for
the observed positive association between average producer size and the magnitude of
an industry’s presence within local labor markets.
∗I wish to thank an anonymous referee and seminar participants at the University of Georgia for their
comments. I am also grateful to Stefani Smith whose suggestions greatly improved the paper. Any errors,
of course, are my own. The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System.
11 Introduction
Production establishments vary considerably in terms of the number of workers they employ.
In the United States, for instance, manufacturing plants are classiﬁed by size categories
ranging from fewer than 10 employees to over 5000. What accounts for this variation? Why
are some economies populated by relatively large production establishments whereas others
contain mostly small ones?
The answers, I believe, may oﬀer valuable insights into a number of important economic
issues. For example, larger plants have been shown to pay higher wages (Brown and Medoﬀ
1989 and Troske 1999) and enhance worker productivity (Idson and Oi 1999). Thus, an
economy’s aggregate labor earnings and eﬃciency may be tied to the extent to which it
organizes its workers into large establishments rather than small ones. Moreover, an econ-
omy’s ﬁrm size distribution may also help to account for a number of additional outcomes,
including the degree to which it invests in research and development (Cohen and Levin
1989), the nature of its short run employment ﬂuctuations (Evans 1987, Dunne et al. 1989,
Audretsch and Mahmood 1995, and Davis et al. 1996), and its path of long run growth
(Fukuyama 1995 and Kumar et al. 1999).
Unsurprisingly, then, the literature studying the determinants of producer size is exten-
sive. Indeed, for decades, theories of the ﬁrm have suggested a variety of technological and
institutional factors, including the distribution of skill (e.g. Lucas 1978, Rosen 1982, and
Kremer 1993), the eﬀectiveness of an economy’s judicial and ﬁnancial systems (e.g. Kumar
et al. 1999) and its regard for property rights (e.g. Grossman and Hart 1986 and Hart and
Moore 1990), as key elements underlying a producer’s overall scale.1
1Kumar et al. provide a recent survey of this work as well as some empirical evidence on several of the
2Notwithstanding these previous contributions, this paper suggests that producer size
may also be inﬂuenced by an element that, surprisingly, has been largely overlooked: the
costs associated with labor market search. That is, the number of employees that a ﬁrm
chooses to hire may depend criticallyon the expected cost of identifying, recruiting, training,
and replacing those workers periodically. To be sure, researchers have long noted that ﬁrms
face substantial ﬁxed hiring and training costs (e.g. Oi 1962), which may help to explain
patterns of worker turnover with respect to wages or skill. This paper argues that these
costs may also inﬂuence the overall size that ﬁrms achieve.
Two pieces of empirical evidence provide the basic motivation for this idea. First, the
quantity of resources devoted to ﬁlling a vacancy tends to rise with producer size. Barron
et al. (1985), for instance, show that large production establishments spend more hours
screening, interviewing, and recruiting per worker, interviewing, on average, a largernumber
of workers per position than small ones. The speciﬁc ﬁgures they report are reproduced in
Table 1.
Second, employment turnover is signiﬁcantly higher in terms of absolute numbers of
workers coming and going among large employers. Notably, Davis et al. ﬁnd that over the
period 1973 to 1988, manufacturing establishmentswith 1000 to 2499 employees experienced
an average annual gross job reallocation rate (the sum of job creation and destruction
expressed as a fraction of total employment) of 13.5 percent. For plant sizes 2500 to 4999
and 5000 or more employees, gross job reallocation rates averaged 13.6 percent and 10.9
percent, respectively.
While small manufacturing plants experienced higher reallocation rates (those with 0
theories.
3to 19, 20 to 49, and 50 to 99 employees experienced rates of 42 percent, 28.6 percent,
and 25.6 percent respectively) this evidence indicates that large plants must search for a
considerably larger absolute number of workers in a typical year than small ones. Hence,
large establishments need to be able to ﬁnd and hire greater numbers of workers simply as
a result of the natural turnover they face each year.
When combined, these two sets of results suggest that worker turnover and labor market
search become an increasingly signiﬁcant concern as employers hire greater numbers of
employees. One should expect, therefore, that producers wishing to employ large numbers
of workers will tend to locate in markets with lower search costs. Alternatively, to the extent
that there are economies of scale in production, ﬁrms who ﬁnd themselves in environments
in which search is easy should tend toward larger equilibrium sizes. Either way, the same
basic conclusion emerges: markets that facilitate labor market search will tend to organize
their economic activity around larger production establishments.
Conceptually, of course, the notion that producer scale may be inﬂuenced by the costs
of managing groups of workers is not new. Most famously, Coase (1937) suggested that
the reason why ﬁrms exist at all is to economize on the costs associated with coordinating
transactions (e.g. writing contracts), which tend to be lower between agents within ﬁrms
than between agents in a decentralized market. Concerning the eventual size that a ﬁrm
achieves, Coase (p. 396) noted that “a ﬁrm will tend to be larger ...the lessthe costsof
organizing and the slower these costs rise with an increase in the transactions organized.”
While much of the literature has characterized these organization costs as those stem-
ming from managing or monitoring groups of workers (e.g. Williamson 1967 and Rosen
1982), the evidence just surveyed indicates that this concept may be extended to include
4the cost of maintaining a workforce that turns over periodically. With worker turnover,
ﬁrms must engage in costly search to replace those who leave for one reason or another.
Hence, there may be a signiﬁcant labor search aspect to the issue of producer size. This
paper attempts to formalize this idea.
The formal analysis appears in the next section, which develops the model and derives
the basic theoretical results regarding the determinants of employer size. Section 3 then
oﬀers a brief discussion of the model’s empirical implications. In particular, because the
geographic concentration of industry (i.e. ‘localization’) has long been held to facilitate a
producer’s search for workers (as well as a worker’s search for employers), the model implies
that ﬁrms situated in heavily localized areas ought to be larger. Casual evidence seems to
bear this implication out.
2 A Model of Producer Size
2.1 Baseline Speciﬁcation
Consider an economy comprised of a single producer (or ﬁrm) and a continuum of workers.2
The producer is endowed with an exogenously determined quantity of physical capital, k,
and must hire workers to use this capital in the production of output. Each worker, in turn,
is characterized by a level of skill, q, equal to one of T possible values: q1,q 2,...,q T,w h e r e
q1 ≥ q2 ≥ ...≥ qT > 0. Let the proportion of the total worker population with skill level
qt be denoted by µt,t=1 ,2,...,T where
 T
t=1 µt =1 .
The hiring process, I assume, takes the following simple form. For each of an endoge-
2By assuming a continuum, I am restricting the worker skill distribution to be stationary in the presence
of discrete numbers of draws.
5nously determined number of vacancies, the producer takes random draws from the labor
force until an ‘acceptable’ worker (that is, one with a satisfactory skill level, q) is found.
The ﬁrm then ﬁlls the vacancy by hiring this worker.3
The collection of workers that a ﬁrm ends up hiring can be represented by a proﬁle
(N1,N 2,...,N T), where each Nt ≥ 0 denotes the number of workers of skill level qt that
the ﬁrm employs. Given such a proﬁle, the primary object of interest in this model, the
producer’s size, will be summarized by the parameter N =
 T
t=1 Nt.
I specify the ﬁrm’s production technology as a Cobb-Douglas function of two elements:
(i) the ﬁrm’s stock of physical capital, k, and (ii) a CES aggregate of the skills of the workers
hired. Hence, the production generated by the ﬁrm with worker proﬁle (N1,N 2,...,N T)i n
a given period of time follows as
Y = kα








where 0 <α , ρ<1. For simplicity, suppose that ρ =1− α so that equation (1) can be
re-written as
Y = kα






This output is then divided between the producer and its workers according to an α,( 1−α)
3This process, of course, implies that workers accept all job oﬀers they receive. Such an assumption,
I hold, is not completely unreasonable. Barron et al. (p. 50), for example, note that, in their data,
“approximately 90 percent of jobs are ﬁlled by a single job oﬀer.”
6split. Thus, the ﬁrm pays its employees (1 − α)Y in aggregate and keeps the remainder,
αY , for itself. This particular division can be justiﬁed by assuming that workers receive
their marginal products, (1−α)kαq−α
t , so that the ﬁrm’s ‘gross payoﬀ’ (i.e. its share of the
output produced) in each period is
Y − (1− α)kα






Notice, given the speciﬁcation of the production function, the ﬁrm’s gross payoﬀ strictly
increases in the number of workers employed: adding an additional worker always increases
αY . Of course, the amount by which an additional worker increases αY depends on the
skill level of that worker: higher q workers add more than lower q workers. So, even though
high-skill workers earn higher wages in this framework, (1 − α)kαq−α
t qt =( 1− α)kαq1−α
t
strictly increases in qt, the producer’s gross return to employing another worker strictly
increases in the worker’s skill level.
Maintaining a workforce of N employees, however, is costly in two respects. First, I
assume that there is a coordination cost given by Nφ units of output per time period,
where φ>1. Intuitively, we can think of this term as representing the idea that, as the
number of workers at the same ﬁrm grows, it becomes increasingly costly to monitor or
manage their activities.4
4This term also ensures that the ﬁrm’s problem has a well-deﬁned solution in the sense that, without it,
the optimal number of workers to hire would be inﬁnite. For ease, I assume that this coordination term is
independent of the skills of the workers hired. While one might argue that more highly skilled workers are,
in some sense, easier to coordinate than less skilled workers, high-skill workers may also have more complex
tasks to complete (e.g. Kremer) that should increase the costs of coordination. Because the net eﬀect is
not, a priori, clear, I utilize the expression above.
7Second, the ﬁrm faces worker turnover. With a constant probability δ,ah i r e dw o r k e r
will leave the ﬁrm in a given time period. Operating with a total of N workers, therefore,
will also require the producer to replace, on average, a total of δN workers in each period.
To capture the costs associated with this process, I assume that a ﬁrm replaces a worker by
randomly drawing potential employees from the labor force at a cost of C units of output
per draw until an acceptable worker is found.5
On average, then, the cost associated with turnover can be expressed as the product
of two terms: the expected number of replacements per period and the expected cost per
replacement. The ﬁrst piece is simply δN. The second can be derived by noting that, in
a Bernoulli process with probability p of ‘success,’ the expected number trials before the
ﬁrst success is 1
p (see, for example, Cinlar 1975, p. 57). Thus, since the probability that a
random draw from the labor force will yield an acceptable worker is
 T
t=1 µt·1(qt ∈ Ω) where
1(·) is an indicator function taking a value of 1 if qt is contained in the set of acceptable
skill levels Ω and 0 otherwise, the expected cost to the producer of replacing one vacated
position is C  T
t=1 µt·1(qt∈Ω). The expected replacement cost per period, then, follows as
CδN
 T
t=1 µt · 1(qt ∈ Ω)
. (3)
5Although one could certainly argue that C may, itself, be a decreasing function of the turnover probability
δ (i.e. greater turnover implies a larger set of workers seeking employment, therefore, a lower cost of drawing
one worker), I treat the two parameters C and δ as separate. Doing so, I hold, is innocuous in terms of the
inferences drawn from the model since the comparative-static results derived below with respect to changes
in C would be similar to those derived from changes in the product Cδ. More importantly, as I suggest
in Section 3, aspects of a labor market (e.g. its overall size, density, or rate of growth) may inﬂuence C
independently of δ permitting for an evaluation of the eﬀects of a change in C holding δ constant.
8Ultimately, what the ﬁrm seeks to maximize is the average level of proﬁt (i.e. the expected
value of its gross payoﬀ, αY , net of both coordination and expected turnover costs) that
it receives over time.6 Realizing that more than one acceptable level of worker skill means
that the exact composition of its employed workforce will (likely) vary from one time period
to another due to turnover, the expected value of the producer’s gross payoﬀ, E(αY), can
be calculated as follows. Note ﬁrst that, from (2), when N workers (whose identities are
indexed by j) are hired, αY can be written as
 N
j=1 αkαh1−α
j where hj denotes the skill





j |hj ∈ Ω) = αkαNE(h1−α
j |hj ∈ Ω) (4)
where, again, Ω is the set of skill levels the ﬁrm deems acceptable. Because openings
are ﬁlled from sets of random draws from a population with (known) skill distribution




t µt · 1(qt ∈ Ω)
 T
t=1 µt · 1(qt ∈ Ω)
. (5)
Combining this expression with those for the coordination and expected turnover costs
yields the following equation for the producer’s expected proﬁts, π:
6By assumption, then, the ﬁrm is not concerned with the costs associated with ﬁnding its ﬁrst N em-




t µt · 1(qt ∈ Ω)
 T




t=1 µt · 1(qt ∈ Ω)
− Nφ. (6)
The ﬁrst result that I establish is that the maximization of (6) involves the producer’s use
of a cutoﬀ strategy when selecting workers from the labor force.
Proposition 1: The set of workers that the producer ﬁnds acceptable satisﬁes a cutoﬀ
property whereby if any skill level q∗ is acceptable, so is any skill level q>q ∗.
Proof: Suppose that a producer of given size N is willing to hire a worker of skill q∗.N o w
consider the eﬀect of adding any q>q ∗ to the set of acceptable skill levels, Ω. First, the
inclusion q>q ∗ will strictly increase the expected gross payoﬀ, E(αY), by increasing the
expected value of a hired worker’s skill raised to the power (1−α). Second, it will decrease
the expected replacement cost CδN  T
t=1 µt·1(qt∈Ω) by decreasing the expected number of draws
required to ﬁnd the ﬁrst acceptable worker. Thus, because the overall eﬀect is to increase
expected proﬁts, if q∗ ∈ Ω, then q ∈ Ω for any q>q ∗.
At the same time, including a lower skill level q<q ∗ in Ω will not always be worthwhile.
Although doing so decreases the expected replacement cost, it also decreases the expected
gross payoﬀ. Hence, the set of acceptable workers satisﬁes a cutoﬀ property.
The ﬁrm’s problem, then, consists of two tasks: (i) setting a reservation level of worker
skill, and (ii) determining the number of employees that maximizes expected proﬁts under
10this cutoﬀ. I assume the ﬁrm solves this problem in the following two stages. First, it
maximizes expected proﬁts with respect to the number of workers, taking the cutoﬀ skill
level as given. Second, after having found an optimal number of workers for each of the
T possible cutoﬀ levels, N(qt),t=1 ,2,...,T, the producer maximizes its expected proﬁts
over N(qt).
Solving such a problem is straightforward. Take the ﬁrm’s cutoﬀ, say equal to qp,a s












µ1 + µ2 + ...+ µp
− Nφ. (7)





1 µ1 + ...+ q1−α
p µp) − Cδ




The selection of a cutoﬀ skill level then follows from the calculation of the optimal N for
each of the T possible values of qp, substituting the resulting sizes into the expression for
expected proﬁts, and ﬁnding the largest value.
2.2 The Case of Two Skill Types
To simplify matters at this point, let there be only two skill types, 1 and 2, with q1 >q 2.
The corresponding proportions of the labor force accounted for by type 1 (i.e. ‘high-skill’)
and 2 (i.e. ‘low-skill’) workers can then be reduced to µ1 = µ and µ2 =1− µ. Following













1 µ + q1−α





for a cutoﬀ of q2. To ensure that both optimal producer sizes are positive, I assume that
the model’s parameters satisfy the following condition which, in essence, simply restricts
the search cost parameter C to be suﬃciently small:
αkαq1−α
1 µ − Cδ > 0.
The following result characterizing the optimal size chosen by a producer follows directly
from expressions (9) and (10).
Proposition 2: For a given cutoﬀ skill level, (i) an increase in the proportion of type 1 (i.e.
high-skill) workers, µ, and/or (ii) a decrease in the search cost parameter, C, will increase
the number of workers that the producer optimally hires.7
7Notice, optimal ﬁrm size also increases in the physical capital of the producer, k, which, if interpreted
as the ‘ability’ of the producer, is similar to the implications of Lucas (1978), Rosen (1982), and Waldman
(1984).
12Proof: This result can be derived by diﬀerentiating (9) and (10). Because φ>1, either an
increase in µ or a decrease in C increases N(q1)a n dN(q2).
This result merely establishes that the number of employees that a producer will op-
timally hire is an increasing function of the fraction of high-skill workers relative to the
fraction of low-skill workers and a decreasing function of the search cost parameter (i.e. the
cost of drawing one worker from the labor force), C. Mechanistically, of course, both points
are straightforward. A producer’s optimal size is determined by the level of N that maxi-
mizes the diﬀerence between two pieces: (i) the expected gross payoﬀ net of the expected






for a ﬁrm with cutoﬀ q1,a n d
N(αkα(q1−α
1 µ + q1−α
2 (1 − µ)) − Cδ)
for a ﬁrm with cutoﬀ q2, it is apparent that both terms increase as either C falls or µ rises
(recall, q1 >q 2). A drop in C, naturally, makes the replacement of a worker less costly for
any producer. A higher value of µ increases the net expected gross payoﬀ of a ﬁrm with
cutoﬀ q1 by making it easier to locate a high-skill worker. For a ﬁrm with cutoﬀ q2,ar i s e
in µ increases the net expected gross payoﬀ by increasing the average fraction of high-skill
workers the producer employs over time.
More importantly, the absolute amount by which these two expressions increase is itself
an increasing function of N. Thus, because the coordination cost schedule, Nφ,d o e sn o t
13change with C or µ, the ﬁrm’s problem will be satisﬁed by a larger value of N as either C
falls or µ rises.
This ﬁrst result, I should note, is somewhat limited in that it derives the eﬀects of
changes in C and µ on N(q1)a n dN(q2) under the assumption that a producer’s cutoﬀ
skill level remains constant. A more general result linking a producer’s optimal scale to a
change in either of these quantities appears below. First, I establish the following property
characterizing the relationship between reservation skill levels and ﬁrm sizes.
Proposition 3: The ﬁrm maximizes its expected proﬁt, selecting a cutoﬀ of q1 and size
N(q1) rather than q2 and N(q2) if and only if N(q1) ≥ N(q2).





− N(q1)φ−1)N(q1) ≥ (αkα(q1−α
1 µ + q1−α
2 (1 − µ)) − Cδ − N(q2)φ−1)N(q2).
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This above expression is equivalent to the one that ensures that N(q1) ≥ N(q2), which can








1 µ + q1−α
2 (1 − µ)) − Cδ)
1
φ−1.
14Hence, π(q1) ≥ π(q2) ⇐⇒ N(q1) ≥ N(q2).
Given Propositions 2 and 3, I now state the following key result.
Proposition 4: An increase in the proportion of type 1 workers, µ, and/or a decrease in
the search cost parameter, C, will increase the number of workers that a producer optimally
hires.
Proof: There are four cases to consider: two in which changes in µ and/or C leave a ﬁrm’s
initial reservation skill unchanged and two in which the ﬁrm’s cutoﬀ switches. In either of
the ﬁrst two cases where the cutoﬀ does not change, Proposition 2 proves the result.
Suppose that a ﬁrm has initial cutoﬀ equal to q1 so that N(q1) >N(q2)b yP r o p o s i t i o n
3. Now let either µ increase and/or C decrease. From Proposition 2, the resulting values of
N(q1)a n dN(q2), denoted N(q1)  and N(q2) , must both increase. Again, from Proposition
3, if the ﬁrm’s new cutoﬀ is q2, then it follows that N(q2)  >N (q1)  >N (q1) >N (q2).
Likewise, if the ﬁrm’s initial cutoﬀ is q2 but subsequent cutoﬀ is q1, then it follows that
N(q1)  >N(q2)  >N(q2) >N(q1).
Thus, a drop in the cost associated with drawing a worker from the labor pool or an increase
in the proportion of high-skill workers in the labor force will increase a producer’s optimal
size, regardless of its impact on the producer’s cutoﬀ level of skill.
Notice, this simple framework can account for the evidence documented by Barron et
15al. regarding the relationship between employer size and recruiting eﬀort. Consider, for
example, two markets that diﬀer only with respect to the search cost parameter, C.I ft h e
ﬁrm in the market with the lower cost (ﬁrm 1) and, thus, greater optimal employment, has
a cutoﬀ of q1, while the ﬁrm in the market with the higher cost (ﬁrm 2) has a cutoﬀ of q2,
ﬁrm 1 will, on average, review more candidates for each job opening than ﬁrm 2.8 Hence,
if large producers are more selective than small producers with respect to the workers they
are willing to hire, large ﬁrms will search more extensively than small ﬁrms when ﬁlling a
vacancy.
2.3 Type-Speciﬁc Turnover Rates
Although the model above restricts the separation rate, δ, to be uniform across all workers,
this assumption can be relaxed with little change in the results. Suppose that workers have
type-speciﬁc separation rates: δ1,δ 2,...,δ T that are (weakly) decreasing in skill, so that
δ1 ≤ δ2 ≤ ... ≤ δT. This parameter restriction is compatible with a host of empirical
evidence (e.g. Pencavel 1970, Parsons 1972, and Neal 1998) that has established an inverse
relationship between rates of turnover and wages.9
I ns u c hac a s e ,aﬁ r mw i t hac u t o ﬀe q u a lt oqp will now face the following problem:
8If a ﬁrm initially has cutoﬀ equal to q2,ad r o pi nC may induce the ﬁrm to adopt a cutoﬀ of q1
subsequently. Thus, this particular scenario is certainly possible. The reverse, as it turns out, is not true. A











when N(q1) >µ N(q2) which will hold if q1 is initially the cutoﬀ (recall Proposition 3).
9This restriction also preserves the producer’s use of a cutoﬀ strategy. Note that if more highly skilled
workers have higherrates of turnover, a ﬁrm that is willing to hire a worker with skill qp would not necessarily
be willing to hire a worker of greater skill. Although doing so would certainly increase the ﬁrm’s expected

















(µ1 + µ2 + ...+ µp)2 − Nφ. (11)
The only diﬀerence between this objective function and that given by (7) lies in the spec-
iﬁcation of the expected turnover cost. To be sure, it still follows as the product of two
terms: the expected cost per replacement and the average number of replacements that
must be found each period. The ﬁrst term is simply the same as before: with a cutoﬀ of
qp, C
µ1+µ2+...+µp units of output are required, on average, to ﬁll a vacated position. The





µ1 + µ2 + ...+ µp
.































1 µ + q1−α





17for a cutoﬀ of q2. Notice that from this more general framework, the implications regarding
ﬁrm size with respect to changes in the cost of drawing a worker from the labor force, C,
still hold. All else constant, a lower value of C induces a producer to hire more workers
regardless of the impact on the producer’s cutoﬀ.
It also follows in this more general formulation that an increase in the proportion of
high-skill workers, µ, will lead to the producer choosing to operate with greater numbers
of workers. The rationale for this result ought to be apparent. For ﬁrms with a cutoﬀ of
q1,a ni n c r e a s ei nµ reduces the expected turnover cost relative to the expected gross payoﬀ
by making type 1 workers easier to ﬁnd. For ﬁrms with a cutoﬀ of q2,ah i g h e rv a l u eo fµ
increases the expected gross payoﬀ by increasing the average fraction of high-skill workers
who are hired and, simultaneously, decreases the expected turnover cost by increasing the
average fraction of ‘low-turnover’ workers hired over time.
This latter point, interestingly, suggests that as the proportion of high-skill workers
in the labor force rises, ﬁrms not only become larger, but also may exhibit lower average
rates of turnover. Note that if a ﬁrm has a cutoﬀ of q1, the turnover rate remains equal
to δ1. As described above, however, if a ﬁrm has a cutoﬀ of q2, the average turnover rate,
δ1µ + δ2(1 − µ), decreases. In a cross section of producers consisting of both types, then,
there may be a inverse relationship between average plant size and turnover that would be
consistent with Davis et al.’s evidence on job ﬂows cited in the Introduction.
183 Concluding Discussion
The model developed above has two primary implications. First, ﬁrms will tend toward
larger sizes in markets in which a greater proportion of the overall labor force is skilled.
This implication, of course, has a long tradition in technological theories of the ﬁrm (e.g.
Lucas 1978, Rosen 1982, and Kremer 1993) that suggest that larger organizations require
more capable individuals. More competent managers, for instance, might be able to mon-
itor and coordinate greater numbers of workers more eﬀectively than less competent ones.
Alternatively, large ﬁrms may utilize a more extensive division of labor that places greater
importance on the successful completion of any particular task. Such organizations, there-
fore, will rely on more skilled individuals performing those tasks.
The framework oﬀered here merely suggests that a larger fraction of high-skill workers
in the labor force increases the average level of skill among the workers that a ﬁrm hires
over time. Because physical capital and worker skill are complementary in the model, the
expected return to hiring an additional worker increases with the average skill level of the
labor force. The result is a larger optimal ﬁrm size.
Second, and more importantly, the model implies that producers will operate at a larger
scale when the cost of replacing workers is smaller. Although various labor market insti-
tutions such as employment agencies may facilitate the ﬁrm-working matching process, the
literature studying urban labor markets has suggested that the presence of a large number
of workers who possess skills speciﬁc to a particular industry will oﬀer ﬁrms within that
industry an environment in which worker replacement is relatively easy.
To be sure, the connection between geographic agglomeration and productivity gains
has been the subject of considerable research. Localization economies and their eﬀects
19on industrial growth, for example, have been quantiﬁed by numerous studies including
Henderson (1986), Glaeser et al. (1992), and Henderson et al. (1995). Although ﬁrms
may beneﬁt from industrial concentration for a variety of reasons, Henderson (pp. 47-48)
suggests that localization economies may, at least in part, be the result of “labor market
economies where industry size reduces search costs for ﬁrms looking for workers with speciﬁc
training relevant to that industry.”10
Why might search costs be lower when the extent of the local (relevant) labor market
is greater? One possibility, certainly, is that information may ﬂow more extensively in
populous areas so that a given job advertisement, for example, may be seen by a larger
number of potential employees. Hence, paying a certain cost to recruit an employee for a
job opening may produce a larger number of applicants in a thick market than in a thin
one.11
Although little empirical work has examined ﬁrm and worker search patterns in local
geographic areas, there is some evidence to support this idea. Dumais et al. (1997), for
instance, ﬁnd that the decision of a ﬁrm to locate in a metropolitan area is strongly tied to
the presence of workers whose occupations match well with that ﬁrm’s needs. Such a result,
of course, is compatible with the idea that large pools of ‘appropriate’ workers facilitate the
search for employees and, thus, tend to attract producers. Additionally, in a study of urban
markets in Israel, Alperovich (1993) ﬁnds that unemployment duration is signiﬁcantly lower
in more populous areas. This result may indicate that ﬁrms and workers are able to conduct
10This idea actually dates back to Marshall (1920) who suggested that labor market search considerations
are an important reason for localization.
11Hence, for a given turnover rate δ, dense urban markets may reduce C by increasing the number of
‘contacts’ or ‘interactions’ that occur between agents.
20relatively extensive searches more easily and, thus, ﬁnd acceptable matches more quickly in
thicker markets.
In terms of the model presented above, this idea can be captured as follows. Suppose
that paying a ﬁxed search cost, F, attracts a ﬂow of λ candidates. The per worker search
cost C (i.e. the cost of taking a single draw from the available pool of labor) is then F
λ.
If, as just suggested, λ increases with the extent of the relevant labor market, C should be
lower in markets with larger supplies of appropriate labor. Following Proposition 4, thick
markets should produce larger production establishments.
Interestingly, such an implication appears to have some empirical support. Holmes
and Stevens (2002), for instance, ﬁnd that production establishments located in areas (e.g.
Census divisions, metropolitan areas, and counties) where an industry is concentrated tend
to be larger than establishments in areas where an industry is less heavily represented.
Henderson (p. 58) ﬁnds a similar result, noting that city-industry employment and average
plant size are positively correlated in U.S. and Brazilian manufacturing data.
One intriguing conjecture that emerges from these results, then, concerns the nature of
localization economies. Although many explanations have been suggested for the positive
link between spatial agglomeration and productivity gains within industries, part of those
gains may be associated with producers operating on a larger scale. As noted in the Intro-
duction, empirical evidence indicates that larger establishments pay higher wages (Brown
and Medoﬀ 1989, Troske 1999) and enhance worker productivity (Idson and Oi 1999). The
extent to which these two well-established empirical regularities, localization economies and
the producer-size wage premium, are connected, therefore, may be a promising avenue for
future research.
21Appendix
Table 1: Establishment Size and Search Activity Per Job
Establishment Size Hours Spent Recruiting, Number of Applicants
(Employees) Screening, and Interviewing Interviewed
1 to 9 6.17 5.19
10 to 25 7.14 6.27
26 to 250 9.35 6.97
251 to 4715 12.74 8.26
Note: Results reported by Barron et al. (1985, p. 46).
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